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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the effects of emigration on growth in developing
countries. We present a model in which productivity increases either through imita-
tion or innovation, and both activities use the same types of human capital as
inputs, albeit with different intensities. Heterogenous agents accumulate human
capital responding to economic incentives, and might be able to emigrate. When
no migration of skilled workers is allowed, backwards countries converge to the
technological frontier. The possibility of migration, however, distorts the optimal
accumulation of human capital and slows down, or even hinders, development. This
effect is stronger the farther away a developing country is from the technological
frontier. Thus, technologically backward countries are more likely to suffer from
a negative brain drain effect. Among these countries, those which implement ap-
propriate policies, subsidizing the accumulation of the most useful type of human
capital, improve their growth performance. They converge faster, and possibly to
a higher productivity level than countries where such policies are neglected.
JEL Classification: I28, F22, J24, O40.
Keywords: Education, Migration, Human Capital, Economic Growth.
1 Introduction
Classical theoretical studies on the Brain Drain hold that emigration of highly educated
people is beneficial for destination countries and harmful for source ones (e.g. Borjas
1994, Borjas 1995). For immigration countries, the inflow of highly skilled individuals
increases the pool of available human capital, and boosts economic growth in the long-
run. A specular logic seems to imply that the outflow of ‘brains’ is damaging for the
source countries.1
∗We are greatly indebted to Sjak Smulders and Emiliya Lazarova for many insightful discussions.
We would also like to thank Edwin van der Werf for numerous suggestions. Maurizio Zanardi, and
the participants to the ENTER Jamboree 2006 in Stockholm provided useful comments on a previous
version. All remaining errors are, of course, ours.
†Both authors: CentER and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, P.O.
Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands. E-mail: C.DiMaria@uvt.nl (corresponding author) and
P.Stryszowski@uvt.nl.
1Several theoretical studies have pointed at the potential negative effect of the outflow of human
capital on source countries, among others: Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), Kwok and Leland (1982),
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), and Miyagiwa (1991).
1
Brain Drain and Distance to Frontier 2
This theoretical prediction, however, is at odds with the experience of some sending
countries that grew faster than their relatively more closed neighbours. Examples in-
clude Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore as opposed to Bangladesh, India and
Indonesia, for example.2 A recent literature on the effects of the outflow of skilled wor-
kers has focused on the potential for a Beneficial Brain Drain (BBD), or a Brain Gain.
The central proposition of studies such as Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmenstein, and
Prskawetz (1997) and (1998), Vidal (1998), and Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001)
is that, if the possibility of emigration induces more skill-creation than skill-loss, source
countries might actually increase their stock of human capital, as the possibilities of
moving and working abroad increase. One of the simplest mechanisms behind results
of this type is that the possibility of emigration might lead economic agents to invest
more in their human capital. Yet, since not all of them emigrate in the end, also those
who stay in the country of origin have a higher human capital than would otherwise
have been the case. Under such circumstances, the simple ‘drain’ effects emphasized by
earlier contributions are (possibly) more than compensated by these ‘gain’ effects.
Empirical investigations of the effects of skilled migration on source countries have pro-
vided mixed results. While most authors would agree that migration of skilled workers
is positive for the destination country,3 there is no consensus as refers to the effects on
the source economies. Recent empirical work by Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2004)
has indeed shown that the net effect of the brain drain can be either positive or negative.
Despite the significant and positive effect on human capital accumulation that they are
able to identify, Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport show that the effects in terms of annual
GDP growth are more mixed. Indeed, according to their estimates the BBD hypothesis
is supported by the data only for a small number of countries. The authors conclude by
noting that ”the simple fact that, among sending countries there are winners and losers,
points to the necessity of a better understanding of the circumstances and factors favou-
ring the occurrence of a detrimental brain drain”.4 In this paper we aim at contributing
to the debate on the brain drain by focussing on the role played by the composition of
human capital in fostering productivity growth and, finally, economic development.
The BBD hypothesis implicitly assumes that the human capital that is accumulated
with a view to emigration can prove useful once people remain in their country of
origin. One might ask if this is a realistic assumption. Indeed, it runs counter to some
empirical evidence showing that countries with similar levels but different compositions
of education (which we use as a proxy for human capital accumulation) by type have
very different performances in terms of convergence and growth. If all human capital
would be useful, a higher level thereof would imply faster GDP growth, irrespective of
its composition, all else equal.
Although not much addressed in the literature, the different roles played by different ty-
pes of human capital at different stages of development has been recognized by a number
2Japan and, to a greater extent, South Korea experienced high levels of skilled emigration in the
past decades. South Korea, for example, still had a rate of brain drain of over 9% among highly skilled
workers in 1990. In the same year Taiwan and Singapore exhibited even higher rates: 15.2% and 24.8%,
respectively. By comparison India (3.9%), Bangladesh (2.1%), and Indonesia (3.9%) suffered a much
smaller drain of human capital. This high rates of brain drain notwithstanding, Japan and the Asian
Tigers where much more successful in terms of economic performance than the countries in the other
group.
3An excellent reference on these issues is Borjas (1990).
4Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2004), p.35.
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of authors. Both Durlauf and Johnson (1997) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) provide
evidence as to the heterogenous effects of education on growth across countries with dif-
ferent levels of development. Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2001),
instead, discuss the existence of non-linearities in the education-growth relationship.
Based on this, in what follows we claim that not all the human capital accumulated
in view of possible emigration is appropriate for the technology available in the source
country, and for its level of development. In particular, we postulate that the distance
to the technological frontier is a key determinant for understanding the effects of human
capital accumulation/composition on economic growth. While the accumulation of hu-
man capital seems to imply faster technological advancement and economic growth, we
point at the different types of human capital that are most useful at different stages of
development. This view reflects the idea that technological advances become available
either through imitation or through innovation, and that each activity requires (a diffe-
rent combination) of different types of skills. It is reasonable to assume that imitation
requires a more technically inclined work force, whereas the more complex activity of
innovation requires more than technical skills alone. Indeed, the closer economies are
to the frontier, the more complex their economic and institutional systems, the higher
their need for a balanced work force comprising technical skills, creativity, humanistic
competencies, legal and managerial expertise. Conversely, at earlier stages of economic
development, when the main task is to copy and adapt available technologies, a more
intense specialization in technical skills can prove helpful in catching up.
Following Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2004), we model two economies that
can be parameterized by their distance from the technological frontier. Economic devel-
opment is driven by productivity growth, and productivity improvements depend on the
amount and the composition of the human capital available in the country, besides on
the distance from the technological frontier. Once at the frontier of technology, produc-
tivity advances are only possible through innovation, whereas imitation occurs further
away from the frontier. Following on our argument above, we assume that imitation is
more intensive in technical skills than innovation.
To investigate the distortionary effects of migration on the accumulation of human
capital, we model human capital accumulation by agents as an endogenous decision.
By letting the type of skills acquired be determined by the costs and benefits faced by
heterogenous agents, we add one important dimension to our model. We are in fact able
to investigate the interaction between labour market outcomes, migration possibilities
and institutional arrangements, such as the existence of educational policies targeted at
satisfying the needs of the local economy.
Our results show that the possibility of migration distorts the incentives for agents to
accumulate the type of human capital that is appropriate for the country of origin, given
its level of development. We show that when migration becomes possible at early stages
of economic development the growth rate of the source economy decreases. We discuss
circumstances under which this process leads to development traps, i.e. situations where
the process of convergence to the technological frontier stops prematurely. Furthermore,
we show that educational policies, in the form of subsidies to particular types of skills,
can counteract the negative effects of migration on growth. Assuming that in democra-
tic societies migration cannot be (completely) prevented, our analysis delivers a clear
policy recommendation: Countries that wish to maximize their convergence potential
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should take this mechanism into account and increasingly subsidize appropriate skills,
the further away they are from the technological frontier, and the easier the prospects
of migration.
2 Education, migration and economic development
At the aggregate level, the relationship between brain drain and economic growth is far
from univocal. To illustrate this point, we consider the growth rates of the GDP for 128
countries in 2000 and their rate of brain drain – measured as the percentage of tertiary
educated residents who emigrate – ten years earlier. Figure 1 presents the scatter plot
of the two variables and the regression line. The two variables show very little evidence
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Figure 1: GDP growth and brain drain.
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 and Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk (2005).
The lack of any significance of this aggregate relationship does not mean much, however,
as it simply hides a whole range of situations where countries experienced different
degrees of brain drain and various degrees of success in terms of economic growth.
Among these, we find the experience of the East Asian economies to be one of the most
interesting.
In the last fifty years countries like Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong
and Taiwan all exhibited astonishing growth rates. At the same time, they pursued a
policy of open borders, i.e. a significant share of their highly skilled workers left over
the years to work abroad. Compared to countries with similar rates of brain drain




·%BrainDrain1990. The GDP growth
rates are derived from the Penn World Table 6.1 from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), the rates of
brain drain from Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk (2005).
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and initial levels of development, however, these East Asian economies performed much
better and managed to catch-up with first-world standards of living (and technological
knowledge) within a short time period.
There are many important lessons to be learned from the experience of these countries
and, indeed, many pages have been filled with analyses of the East Asian “miracle”.6
Here we draw attention to one specific aspect of these economies that has not been
fully appreciated by previous analyses: all these economies have exhibited a marked
commitment of the government to promote the accumulation of particular types of skills.
As World Bank (1993) puts it, “public funding of post-secondary education focused on
technical skills [. . . ] The result of these policies has been a broad, technically inclined
human capital base well-suited to rapid economic development”.7


















Republic of Korea 
Figure 2: Share of science and engineering students on total tertiary education (1980).
Source: Own calculations on United Nations Common Data-Base (UNCDB) data.
Despite having shares of public expenditure on education in line with, and sometimes
lower than those in other developing countries,8 the East Asian economies chose to
support the accumulation of specific types of skills which were deemed most useful to
economic development. As shown by the graph in Figure 2, there is no clear relationship
between the accumulation of ‘technical’ skills and the level of economic development.
The Figure reports the percentage of science and engineering students in the total,
in 1980, for an indicative cross-section of developed and developing countries.9 One
remarkable feature of these data is that both poor and rich countries exhibit either high
or low shares of technical students (China vs. India or Finland and Sweden vs. New
Zealand and Canada, for example), so that no clear pattern is visible. What is apparent,
6Two important references analyzing, and rethinking, the East Asian economies’ impressive perfor-
mance are World Bank (1993) and (2001).
7Ibid., page 15. Emphasis added.
8In 1960, for example, the Republic of Korea spent 2.0% of its GDP on education, in the same year
Brazil’s share was 1.9%, and the average for Sub-Saharan African countries was 2.4%. In 1989, Korea’s
budget for education increased to 3.6%, Brazil’s reached 3.7% and for the same sub-set of African
countries the share topped 4.1%. These figures are taken from World Bank (1993), table 5.3.
9Figure 2 is based on computations by the authors on UNCDB data.
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instead, is that countries like the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are at
the top of the distribution.
Can this high share of technically skilled workers explain, at least in part, the success of
the East Asian economies? Another simple graph lends support to this claim. Figure 3
plots the growth rate of a number of developed and developing countries in 1990, against
the share of science and engineering students on total tertiary education in 1980 and
the corresponding regression line.10 The plot seems to imply that having a higher share
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Figure 3: GDP growth (1990) and the share of S&E students (1980).
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 and UNCDB.
The other interesting aspect is how such a composition of human capital was obtained.
Most East Asian economies, in fact, represent clear examples of the government’s inter-
vention into the structure of the tertiary education. In Japan, for example, the system
comprising the National Institute for Educational Policy Research (NIER), founded in
1949, and the Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture,11 has for a long time been
perceived as the “Super-ministry” responsible for adjusting the structure of Japanese
schooling to the needs of local industries. Similar institutional structures also exist in
the countries of the group of the so-called “Asian Tigers”.
More recently, however, there has been an increasing effort to move away from the
predominance of the government and towards the utilization of market mechanisms,
especially in Japan where a deep reform of the educational system is currently under
way. Analysts have argued that such moves reflect fundamental shifts in the mode and
direction of social development. To quote a recent OECD report “the increased diversity




·%S&E1980 ; the sample
consists of 53 countries. Data derived from the Penn World Table 6.1 and the UNCDB.
11In January 2001, the former Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture and the former Science
and Technology Agency were merged and the new Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology was founded.
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and complexity of the modern society and its needs, necessarily have made centralized
decision and control obsolete [. . . ] [M ]arket mechanisms will be the only way to achieve
diversified and multidimensional changes”.12
This shift in paradigm is consistent with the main ideas of our proposed framework.
Since the advancement of knowledge, which is at the basis of economic growth, can
either occur through the creation of new technologies (ideas) or through the adoption of
old technologies from abroad, and since the two activities require different compositions
of human capital, the optimal structure of human capital depends crucially on the stage
of development of any given economy. Thus, in the presence of distortions, different
types of public policies can be necessary to favour the accumulation of different types
of human capital at different stage of development.
We focus on the possibility of migration as one such potential distortion. By blurring
the borders between economic systems at different levels of economic development, mi-
gration distorts the incentives for the optimal accumulation of human capital: agents in
lagging countries prefer to acquire the type of human capital that would be more profi-
table in case of successful migration. Thus the distance to frontier in different countries
could offer a useful key to understand the effects of the brain drain on economies at
different stages of development.
Moreover, policy could provide a way to offset this harmful effect of brain drain on
human capital composition, by regulating the structure of education, as we will argue
in what follows.
3 The model
We describe an economy consisting of two countries, one large destination country and
one small source one. We assume that the destination country (which we can think of as
the group of the OECD countries for concreteness) is the technological leader, whereas
the source country is technologically less developed.13
The economies are populated by workers and firms.
Workers accumulate skills, and supply skilled labour to firms. Skill accumulation is
costly in that some time is necessary to acquire knowledge. We assume that workers
differ in their abilities (their ‘talent’), so that certain types of skills are more difficult to
accumulate (i.e. more time is required) for some agents than for others. For simplicity,
we assume that all workers accumulate skills and that it is only possible to acquire two
types of skills which we broadly label ‘technical’ and ‘general’. Consequently, in the
model there are two types of workers: technically-skilled (T ) and generally-skilled (G)
ones.
Since the net rewards to the accumulation of different skills depends on the wage com-
manded by the specific skill and the cost it entails (in terms of foregone earnings), each
worker decides on the type of skills she wants to acquire based on her specific type.
Each firm engages in production of an intermediate, needed in the production of the
12This quote is from the Japanese National Report of the OECD IMHE-HEFCE project on interna-
tional comparative higher education financial management and governance, 2004.
13In what follows we use the terms destination country, technological leader, and leading country
interchangeably. The same goes for source country, technological follower, and lagging country.
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final good, and invests in technology improvements. We assume that workers are only
used in the latter activity. Hence, firms decide how many workers of each type to
employ in the ‘research’ sector, given that technology can be improved either through
R&D activities (innovation proper), or by adopting existing technologies from the world
technological frontier (imitation).
In the next subsections we describe in greater details the accumulation decisions made
by workers and the parallel innovation choices facing firms. We discuss the choices
in a situation of autarchy, that is a situation in which no migration possibility exists.
This discussion fully characterizes the destination country, given our assumption that
it is large enough that smaller foreign markets are not relevant to its agents’ decisions.
Notice, moreover, that throughout the paper we ignore the possibility that goods be
traded; we do this to be able to clearly identify the effect of migration on workers’
accumulation decisions. Hence, the alternative to autarchy in our framework is simply
a situation in which workers are allowed (with some positive probability) to move from
the lagging to the leading country.
3.1 Investment in education
Each period new cohorts of workers of fixed size are born in each country, thus there
is no population growth. We assume that the population size in the leading country,
L̄, is larger than L, the population in the lagging country. We further assume that
the share of entrepreneurs in the population is the same in both economies. This has
two consequences: first, the number of firms is larger in the leading rather than in
the lagging country; second, the number of workers per firm will be the same across
countries. In this fashion, the relative size of the two economies plays no role in the
model. Without loss of generality, as long as we only look at one country at the time,
we can simplify the analysis by letting the population size equal 1.
Workers only live for one period: each period new agents are born, they decide about
their education, they work for a wage, consume all their income and finally die.
Workers are risk neutral and differ only with respect to the cost they have to incur to
accumulate different types of human capital. They are indexed by j according to their
talent and uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], with the convention that j = 1
corresponds to the most talented individual. The talent of an agent determines her
relative cost of acquiring general skills. Agent j needs to spend a fraction 1− j of her
time to acquire these skills, while we assume that the time-cost of acquiring technical
skills is independent of talent and equal to 1 − ξ for all workers, where ξ ∈ (0, 1) .14
Agent j will thus be able to offer j units of general skills, or ξ of technical skills. Our
modelling choices don’t make general skills overly costly for any individual, however,
for some of them technical skills are easier to acquire and they will therefore invest in
that direction.
The composition of skills between technical and general ones will be determined by
the relative costs of skills accumulation, and by the relative rewards to the particular
kind of skills. Letting the salary for a G-skilled worker at time t be wGt = ωGt At−1
– where ωGt is the wage per effective unit of human capital provided at time t, and
14Effectively this only means that, using the difficulty of developing technical skills as a benchmark,
general skills are relatively easier to acquire for some individuals, and more difficult for others.
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At−1 indicates the level of total factor productivity at time t− 1 – and the salary for a
T -skilled individual be wTt = ωTt At−1, it is possible to identify the marginal worker, j′.
Agent j′, the worker who is indifferent between acquiring technical skills (and earning
wT per each unit she provides) and general ones (thereby earning wG per unit), must
satisfy the following condition:
ωTt ξ = ωGt j′. (1)
All agents indexed by j ∈ [0, j′], will accumulate technical skills, conversely, agents with
j ∈ (j′, 1] will choose to become generalists.








1− j′ 2) ;




Rearranging equation (1) and using the above expression to substitute for j′, we get the







Finally, note that the constraint that j ∈ [0, 1] implies that the supply of graduates with
technical background depends on the supply of G-skills. Hence, the supply of T -skilled
labour is given by:
Tt = ξj′ = ξ
√
1− 2Gt. (4)
3.2 Production and technological progress
In the leading country there are N̄ firms, while in the lagging country there are only
N < N̄ of them. As discussed above, the number of firms in each country is proportional
to the number of workers in each country, so that the size of the economy is immaterial.
Thus, for the sake of generality, we indicate the number of firms by ν in what follows.
Each firm produces one intermediate input for the production of final output, and
engages in productivity-enhancing activities employing skilled workers.
Final output is produced competitively using a continuum of mass ν of intermediates,







where α ∈ (0, 1) and xi,t is the amount of intermediate good i used to produce Y at
time t .
Each intermediate producer acts as a (local) monopolist and produces good i using
the final good with a one-to-one technology. It is then easy to show that, for a given
15Notice that this specification implies G ≤ 1/2.
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level of At, the equilibrium demand for input i equals xi,t = α
2
1−α At. Hence, profit
maximization on the part of intermediate goods’ producers implies that for each firm
monopoly profits equal:
πt = ζAt, (6)
where ζ ≡ 1−αα α
2
1−α .
Moreover, using the expression for inputs’ demand derived above, it is straightforward
that the level of final output is linear in the level of technology and, as a consequence,
the growth rate of output will be the same as the growth rate of technology. Keeping
this in mind, we now analyze the choice faced by firms in formulating their technological
development plans.
Firms employ skilled workers to increase productivity. We assume that productivity
can be improved by being directly involved in R&D activity or by adopting existing
technologies from the world technological frontier:16




nt + (Āt−1 −At−1)T σmtG1−σmt . (7)
Here Tnt represents the amount of T -skills used in innovation at time t, while Tmt
refers to the amount in imitation. The same applies to Gnt and Gmt. We assume
that both types of skills are needed in both innovation and imitation, and that the two
activities differ in that the productivity of G-skilled workers is higher in innovation than
in imitation, i.e. we let σ > φ.
Furthermore, the technological improvement function in (7) implies that imitation is
more productive the further away a country is from the technological frontier, Ā. This
is intuitive since a larger technological gap means that more innovations can be usefully
adopted from abroad. Innovation, instead, becomes more productive with the own
technology level, A, formalizing the idea that a broader technological base is needed to
push the frontier further.
4 Equilibrium under autarchy
To characterize equilibrium situations under autarchy, we need to discuss three possible
types of equilibrium according to the regime of technological change that takes place. In
what follows, we distinguish between equilibria that occur under innovation, equilibria
that obtain under imitation, and mixed equilibria where both activities take place at
the same time.
Let us start with the case where innovation is the only type of productivity-enhancing
activity performed in equilibrium. In this case, new technologies develop according to:17





16This modelling choice closely follows Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2004), who, in turn,
derive it from Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006).
17From now on, we identify variables that refer to the innovation-only case by an upper bar. Variables
without the upper bar refer the imitation-only equilibrium. When necessary, we will distinguish the
mixed equilibrium variables with a tilde: ∼.
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Profit-maximizing firms will choose the amount of each type of skilled labour to employ
in innovation, in order to solve the following maximization problem:
max
Ḡt,T̄t
πt = ζĀt − ω̄TtĀt−1T̄t − ω̄GtĀt−1Ḡt, (9)
subject to (8).

















The above equations, together with (3) constitute the equilibrium. Taking the ratio of
(10) and (11) and substituting for T̄ from the expression in (4), one gets the following










Using this and the supply function in (3), we can illustrate the equilibrium graphically
in the (ω, Gt) plane (see Figure 4, where ω ≡ ω̄Gt/ω̄Tt). The demand for generalists is
represented with the downward sloping curve D̄, whereas the supply is represented by
the upward sloping curve S. The equilibrium obtains when both conditions are satisfied




. This point represents the equilibrium
when a country is fully specializing in innovation, thus this is the equilibrium prevailing
the destination country.










where we have used Φ ≡ φ1−φ .
At the other extreme, we focus on the case in which a country only resorts to imitation to
increase their technological level. Local firms, thus fully specialize in imitation. Except
for this, they behave exactly like their counterparts in the previous case: amending the





At−1 + (Āt−1 −At−1)T σt G1−σt
]− ωTtAt−1Tt − ωGtAt−1Gt. (13)









Since σ > φ, the demand curve for the case of imitation (the dashed line D in Figure 4)
lies below the demand curve for innovation. Intuitively, it is clear that, since skills of type
















Figure 4: The equilibrium without migration in the two countries.
G are more productive in innovation than in imitation, for any given relative wage firms
specializing in innovation would demand relatively more G skills than firms specializing
in imitation. Just as before, the equality of demand and supply will determine the









where Σ ≡ σ1−σ .
From σ > φ, we conclude that when countries fully specialize, the country that does so
in innovation will have a higher level of G.
To complete our analysis, we need to address what happens when firms don’t fully
specialize in either activity. In this case, they will adopt the combination of the two
activities which allow them to maximize their profits. In terms of Figure 4, equilibria of
this type will correspond to points along the supply curve S, comprised between E and
Ē. The weight of each type of activity, innovation and imitation, will be determined by
the relative productivity of each. The higher is the weight of imitation, the closer the
mixed equilibrium will be to E, and vice versa for innovation.
As mentioned at the end of the previous section, the productivity of imitation is higher,
the wider the technological gap. Innovation, on the other hand, is more productive the
closer a country is to the technological frontier. Thus, at an intuitive level it seems
reasonable that, as we move up along the technological ladder, we encounter countries
progressively more active in innovation. In terms of Figure 4, this implies that the
equilibrium would gradually shift from point E, where only imitation occurs, to point
Ē, where innovation is the only activity taking place.
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Given the structure of (7), countries that have a low level of technology have larger in-




– to engage in imitation. These incentives,
however, decrease with the reduction of the distance to frontier. Thus, it would seem
that imitation occurs far away from the frontier; imitation and innovation coexist as
the distance to frontier gets smaller; while only innovation takes place for low levels of
the technological gap. Indeed, in the proposition that follows we show that the choice
of the type of activity to undertake only depends on the distance-to-frontier parameter,
that we define as at = Āt/At ≥ 1.
Proposition 1. Consider the economy described above. There exist two critical values
of the distance to frontier – ãl and ãh – such that, when at−1 < ãl, only innovation
occurs in the equilibrium; when at−1 > ãh, only imitation occurs in the equilibrium; and
when at−1 ∈ (ãl, ãh), both activities take place in the equilibrium.
Proof. See Section A.1 in the Appendix for the proof, and for the expressions of ãl and
ãh.
According to this proposition, there are values of the distance-to-frontier for which
both innovation and imitation occur simultaneously: this is indeed the case when at−1
lies between ãl and ãh, as defined in Section A.1 of the Appendix. In this case, the












and such that ω̃(at−1) ∈ (ω∗, ω̄∗). The corresponding level of the total supply of skills,
G̃(at−1) say, can be read on the labour supply curve, S in Figure 4.
Hence, our economies have an equilibrium at (ω∗, G∗) for all levels of at−1 ∈ [ãh, +∞),
in which case full-specialization in imitation will obtain; the equilibrium switches to a
non-specialization regime with both imitation and innovation happening at the same
time, and (ω̃(at−1), G̃(at−1)) for intermediate levels of a i.e. for at−1 ∈ (ãl, ãh); finally,
full specialization in innovation will occur when at−1 = ãl. In this last case, the wage
rate and the equilibrium level of G-skills are ω̄∗ and Ḡ∗, respectively.
Before moving on to considering how the distance to frontier of the lagging country
evolves over time, there is another important point to make. Since the labor market is
competitive, the wages equal marginal products, hence there are no extra profits from
innovation. However the monopoly profits in the market for intermediates depend on the
productivity level. In the absence of any external distortions, thus, the technological le-
vel is maximized. Since the growth rate of technology is given by gt = (At−At−1)/At−1,
and At−1 is predetermined, the maximization of technology improvements results in out-
put growth maximization at each point in time. In other terms, in the absence of any
other distortions, the market mechanisms are enough to generate the appropriate in-
centives for firms and workers to allocate resources optimally (in terms of growth). We
close this section with the following result:
Proposition 2. In the absence of migration, the market solution is growth maximizing.
Proof. See Section A.2 in the Appendix.
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5 Convergence under autarchy
Having described the possible equilibria, in this section we analyze the evolution over
time of the distance to frontier in the source country when no migration is possible. We
show that the lagging country tends to grow faster than the leading one, and converging
over time towards the technological frontier. Recall that the distance to frontier at time





thus, as long as the growth rate of the lagging country is larger than the growth rate
of the leading one, convergence towards the frontier will occur, that is at will decrease
over time.
Under autarchy, both the leading and the lagging country enjoy a growth maximizing
allocation of workers across skills, that is the ratio Tt/Gt that arises in equilibrium,
maximizes the growth rate as shown above in Proposition 2.




= T̄ φt Ḡ
1−φ
t ,
and it only depends on the equilibrium levels of T̄t and Ḡt, which are independent of at
and constant over time.
To determine the evolution over time of the distance to frontier of the lagging economy,
we need to compare its growth rate with the growth rate of the frontier country, ḡ.
Consider first what happens when the source country is very far from the frontier and,
in particular, when its distance to frontier, at, is larger than the critical value ãh. Under
these circumstances, the lagging country fully specializes in imitation and its growth
rate is given by (at−1 − 1)T σt G1−σt . Contrary to what happened in the leading country,
in this case the growth rate increases with the distance to the technological frontier, as
imitation is more productive the larger the technological gap. The lagging country thus
grows faster than the technological leader and gets closer (at decreasing rates) to the
frontier.
When the distance to frontier reaches the threshold ãh, firms in the lagging country
also begin innovating, as it now proves profitable for them to do so.18 By combining
the two activities firms maximize their productivity, and the growth rate of the lagging
economy remains higher than the rate of expansion of the frontier (ḡ). The process of
convergence continues until the distance to frontier reaches the level at which companies
in the lagging country fully switch to innovation, i.e. until at−1 = ãl. Once the lagging
country has reached this threshold, it makes use of the same production function as
the leading country to increase productivity: the growth rates of the two countries are
now equal, and the process of convergence is completed. This is summarized by the
following:
Proposition 3. In the absence of migration, the lagging country achieves convergence,
and reaches the steady-state distance to frontier ãl.
18As discussed in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.1, the value of eah and eal only depend
on the values of the production elasticities, and on the equilibrium levels of ωG and ωT , that are both
independent of at−1.
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Proof. See Section A.3 in the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward: recall that firms always
choose the composition of innovation/imitation that maximizes the rate of productivity
growth, indeed, we know from Proposition 2 that in the absence of migration the market
outcome is growth maximizing. When a country is lagging away from the frontier,
i.e. when the distance-to-frontier parameter at−1 is larger than ãl, it is advantageous
for firms to perform at least some imitation and not to fully specialize in innovation:
firms exploit the higher productivity of imitation (away from the frontier) relative to
innovation, for any given level of the relative supply of skills. Thus, as long as there is
some gains to be earned by imitating, the average productivity (and hence the growth
rate) will be higher for the lagging country than for the leading country. At any distance
from the frontier larger than ãl, the lagging country has a growth rate higher than ḡ






Figure 5: Convergence without migration.
This catching-up effect, reminiscent of similar effects in the technology diffusion litera-
ture (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chpt. 8), vanishes when the technological
gap disappears. When there are no longer advantages to be derived from imitation, inno-
vation is the only means to foster productivity; full specialization occurs (see Proposition
1), and convergence to the group of technological leaders has been accomplished.
Graphically, this is presented on the (at, gt) plane in Figure 5. The horizontal dashed line
N , stands for the growth rate of the innovating, frontier country, ḡ. The upward-sloping
line M describes the growth rate reported by the economy that employs technological
adoption as its only means to increase productivity. This line slopes upwards because
of the increasing benefits of lagging behind the frontier, as discussed above. The solid
lines with arrow represents the lagging economy’s process of convergence towards the
frontier, through the three different phases of imitation-only (the straight part of the
solid line), imitation-innovation (the curved part) and innovation-only, when it reaches
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the distance at = ãl, where convergence is complete.
6 Migration and distance to frontier
We now turn to analyzing the effects of the possibility of migration on the growth rate
of the lagging country, and on its steady-state level of income.
Assume that both G-skilled and T -skilled workers in the lagging country have some
non-negative, exogenous probability, pG and pT respectively, to migrate to the more
developed leading country. We assume that migration is random, i.e. there is no
possibility of screening potential migrants, and hence workers of each type face the same
probability of migration. First, we study the case when the probability of migration
is the same for both types of workers. Next, we analyze what happens when one type
is favoured by the destination country, i.e. when agents of a given type have a higher
probability of migrating.
6.1 Uniform probability of migration
Suppose that both types of skilled agents G and T have the same chances to migrate to
the frontier country: i.e. having acquired their skills, workers will be able to offer their
labour services abroad with probability pG = pT = p ∈ (0, 1).
The possibility of migration influences the accumulation decisions of workers only in
the source country. Indeed, since wages in the lagging country are lower than in the
leading one, migration proves unappealing to skilled workers from the leading country.
In the lagging country, however, rational workers will take into account that with some
probability they will be able to migrate to the more advanced country and obtain higher
wages.
In this context, the condition for the marginal worker in the destination country reads:
(p at−1 ω̄Tt + (1− p)ωTt) ξ = (p at−1 ω̄Gt + (1− p)ωGt)j′. (15)




we immediately see that (15) implicitly expresses the supply of G-skilled labour in the
source country, for any level of p and at−1. In a graph similar to the one in Figure 4,
the supply curve under migration is characterized by a lower level of ω than the original
curve S, for each level of G. Indeed, for workers to supply any level of G-skills (smaller
than Ḡ∗) the domestic relative wage has to be lower than before, given that the relative
wage abroad is never lower than at home. Figure 6 presents the relative graph. Notice
that in the specific case where the migration probability is the same for both types of
workers, the two lines coincide when both countries specialize in innovation (at point Ē
in the figure).19
19From equation (15), it is possible to rewrite the supply of G-skills in terms of ω as ω = ωno-µ −
(ω̄ − ωno-µ) paω̄T /ωT1−p , where ωno-µ = ξ√1−2G expresses the wage under autarchy, for each level of G.
Since ω̄ is the maximum value for the equilibrium level of the relative wage, it follows that indeed, in
the (G, ω) plane, the supply of G-skills under migration is below S for a > eal, or, which is equivalent,
for G < Ḡ∗.
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Firms’ decisions to hire workers only depend on domestic conditions: given our assump-
tion that the share of entrepreneurs is the same in the two countries, the number of
workers per firm is the same in the two countries and across regimes. Thus, the possi-
bility of migration does not affect the firms decision in any way: firms still maximize























Figure 6: Demand and Supply under Migration.
As before, labour demand and labour supply jointly determine the equilibrium level of
G and T . The probability of migration influences these equilibrium levels by distorting
the accumulation incentives of the workers.
To understand why, remember that while workers respond to price incentives from both
countries, firms only face domestic prices. Thus, at every equilibrium there will be a
wedge between the wage ratio perceived by workers and the wages faced by firms. With
the exception of point Ē where countries are de facto identical as refers to wage rates
and technology, at every other migration equilibrium workers will perceive higher wage
rates than firms. In particular the wage rate ω perceived by workers will be higher than
the one perceived by domestic firms. This is due to the fact that the alternative to
working at home is to work abroad, where only innovation takes place: since generalists
are more productive than technicians in innovation, they are relatively more rewarded
in the leading economy. Thus, workers naturally bias their decision towards G-skilled
labour. From Figure 6, it is apparent that, with the exception of point Ē, where only
innovation occurs, every equilibrium point under migration will be characterized by a
higher level of G-skills than the corresponding autarchy equilibrium. As this happens,
the economy moves away from the growth-maximizing factor composition, T ∗/G∗ (see
Proposition 2), at each level of the distance to frontier larger than ãl. Hence, the growth
rate of the source economy declines, leading to the following result:
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Proposition 4. When migration of skilled workers is possible, the growth rate of the
lagging economy is reduced for all a ∈ (ãl,∞).
Proof. In text.
As before, however, when the distance to frontier is ãl, firms still specialize in innovation
at point N ; offer a relative wage equal to ω̄∗; and hire Ḡ∗ workers. Indeed, when the
probability to migrate is the same for both types of workers, the distortionary effect
of migration decreases with the level of specialization in innovation, or which is the
same, it increases with the distance to frontier, see (15). When the lagging country
fully specializes in innovation, the possibility of migration ceases to play any role. In
this situation the education incentives for agents are identical in both countries.
Elsewhere, however, things are more complicated. For firms it will still be profitable to
combine innovation and imitation for any level of the distance to frontier larger than ãl.
The range (in terms of a) where the two activities coexist, however, is larger now than
under autarchy. The supply of G-skills is in fact larger along the E′− Ē line than along
the S line, for any ω. As a consequence, at ãh the level of G (and of T ) will differ from
its optimal level G∗. Hence, imitation only is not productive enough at ãh to justify full
specialization in this activity. Specialization will necessarily occur at a level of a larger
than ãh, call it ãh1, given that the productivity of imitation increases with the distance
to frontier. This discussion leads us to our next result:
Proposition 5. When migration of skilled workers is possible, and pG = pT = p, the
lagging country converges at a steady-state distance to frontier equal to ãl.
Proof. See Section A.4 in the Appendix.
The conclusion from this and from Proposition 4 is that when no type of skill is favoured
by the leading country in terms of migration, the lagging country still converges to the
same level of development as before the introduction of migration, but it does so at a
slower rate than before.
We can summarize the effects of the probability of migration in this situation as fol-
lows: in the first place migration distorts the accumulation of human capital reducing
the growth rate (from imitation). Graphically, this is presented in Figure 7, where the
downward sloping line M1 is below the line M , that represents the growth rate without
migration. Second, since imitation is now less productive cœteris paribus, firms will tend
to begin innovating further away from the technological frontier. Indeed, the threshold
value for innovation, ãh, shifts right to ãh1 in Figure 7.20 Third, the process of conver-
gence, however, continues up to the point ãl, the same one as in the no-migration case,
since the distortionary effect of migration is irrelevant when both countries specialize in
innovation and the probability of migration is the same across workers’ type.
20This can be easily seen from expression (A.2) in Appendix A.1. The introduction of migration
makes technicians scarcer and reduces the relative wage faced by firms, since σ > φ this signifies an
increase in the threshold level eah.







Figure 7: Convergence with migration, and pG = pT .
6.2 Non-uniform probability of migration
In the previous subsection we have shown that, if both types of human capital have the
same probability of migration, the lagging country achieves full convergence and the
steady-state distance to frontier is ãl. When the probabilities of migration differ across
skill types, however, workers’ incentives to accumulate skills are distorted to an even
larger extent.
The analysis here parallels the analysis performed above for the case of uniform probabi-
lities, with the exception that we assume that G-skilled workers, being more productive
in innovation, will be more demanded in the frontier country than T -type workers and
will accordingly face a higher probability of migration, i.e. we assume that pG > pT . Let
us first rewrite (15), allowing for different probabilities of migration in different sectors:
(pT at−1 ω̄Tt + (1− pT )ωTt) ξ = (pG at−1 ω̄Gt + (1− pG)ωGt) j′. (16)
As in the previous case, the probability of migration distorts the accumulation of human
capital and reduces the growth rate, all else equal. Here, however, the fact that pG is
larger than pT increases the expected value of accumulating G-skills to a larger degree.
One of the consequences is that, in this case, the distortion affects the accumulation
of skills also when the distance to frontier equals ãl. Indeed, from equation (16), it is
apparent that, even when workers face the same wages per unit of effective labour both
at home and abroad (ω̄G and ω̄T ), the relative wage perceived by potential migrants is
higher than ω̄∗, causing an over-supply of G-skills.
Moreover, the conclusions from Proposition 4 also hold in this case, and are further
reinforced by the positive difference between pG and pT . Thus, the growth rate decrea-
ses further relative to the case where the probability of migration is expressed by the
common p. From these two observation we can derive the following:
Proposition 6. When migration of skilled workers is possible, and pG > pT , the steady-
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state distance to frontier of the sending economy increases. Moreover, complete specia-
lization in innovation is never achieved by the lagging country.
Proof. See Section A.5 in the Appendix.
We use Figure 8 to complete the discussion of this case. The line M2 in the figure
lays strictly below the M line, which represents the growth rate without migration
possibilities. However, based on our discussion above, we know that this line also lies
below the line, M1, that we used in Figure 7 to illustrate the case of common p.
gt





Figure 8: No convergence with migration, and pG 6= pT .
The mechanism at work is the same as before: far away from the frontier it pays to
concentrate skills in imitation, since this is the most profitable activity. The decrease in
the distance to frontier, however, reduces the productivity gap between imitation and
innovation. When the productivity has decreased enough, we observe a switch away
from pure imitation. This happens for a value of a equal to ãh2 > ãh1 > ãh, given
the existence of larger distortions in this context (the possibility of migrating and the
different probabilities of doing so).
That the economy is distorted to a larger degree, finally, is evident from the fact that the
lagging country experiences a development trap in this case. The fact that generalists
are more favoured in migration means that technical skills become scarcer in the source
country also at ãl. Thus the growth performance of the lagging country cannot exceed
the growth performance of the leading country (which is the speed of expansion of the
frontier) at ãl. By the continuity of the function expressing the growth rate, and the
fact that it increases with the distance to frontier (see the Appendices for the details)
we conclude that the process of convergence towards the frontier must stop short of ãl.
We identify this long-run rest-point of the system by ãtrap in the Figure, to emphasize
the suboptimal nature of this outcome. Despite having the potential to reach the other
countries at the frontier, the distortions induced by the workers’ migration prospects lock
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the country in a vicious circle of inappropriate accumulation of skills, lower economic
growth (relative to potential) and persistently larger distance from the frontier.
7 The role of subsidies in the process of development
In the previous sections we have shown the effects of human capital’s composition on
the rate of economic growth and the potential convergence of a developing country. We
concluded that the prospect of migration distorts the composition of human capital in
the lagging countries and that, as a consequence, the brain drain translates into smaller
growth rates and, potentially, into steady-states with larger gaps from the technological
leaders.
A natural concern for policymakers in developing countries might then be to design
policies aimed at correcting the distortions, and at adjusting the formation of human
capital to the needs of local entrepreneurs. In this section we investigate one such
instrument: targeted subsidies to education.
Under migration, the composition of human capital is suboptimal from the lagging
country perspective, thus subsidies might be used as additional incentives to adopt the
‘appropriate’ type of skills. To off-set the negative impact of brain drain on human
capital composition, policymakers in the lagging country could consider subsidizing the
acquisition of technical education or, which is equivalent, taxing general skills. Without
loss of generality, in what follows we consider subsidies to technical education.
Formally, we present subsidies as an increase in the returns to this type of education.
Workers offering ξ units of technical skills on the market will receive a compensation
of wT ξ(1 + τ), where τ > 0 is the subsidy rate. Our modelling of subsidies provides a
rather general representation of monetary transfers, in fact, every agent of type T works
the same hours, and thus receives the same amount of subsidies.
To see how the subsidy to technical education corrects the distortionary effects of the
possibility of migration, consider Figure 9.
In the figure we draw the expected income of agents accumulating T - and G-skills as
a function of the agent’s type, j ∈ [0, 1]. Investment in T -skills requires (1 − ξ) units
of time, irrespective of the agent’s type. Hence, labour income equals wT ξ for any
agent. The cost of accumulating G-skills, instead, depends on the type of the agent. An
agent indexed by j must spend (1− j) units of her time to accumulate capital. She can
subsequently derive an income equal to wG j from her skills. Point A, the point where
the horizontal wT ξ line crosses the sloping (0− wG) one, identifies j′, the agent who’s
indifferent between the two types of skills. This point also determines the supply of G
and T skills according to (3) and (4).
In the absence of migration, this point determines the optimal supply (and compositi-
on) of skills. When migration possibilities enter the picture, however, expected wages
increase for both skill types, and both schedules shift up. The wages raise from wG to
w′G and wT to w
′
T . However, since G-skills are relatively more rewarded abroad, the
upwards shift in the sloping line is more marked, the relevant curves now cross in B,
and the indifferent agent has a lower index: j′′. Accordingly, the supply of G-skills in-
creases, while that of T -skills decreases. This yields a suboptimal result in terms of the
availability of skills for domestic firms. As discussed in previous sections, this results

















Figure 9: Effects of a subsidy (τ) to technical education.
in a reduction of the growth rate and, when pG > pT , in an increase of the long-run
distance to frontier: a development trap.
Increasing the returns to accumulating technical skills tends to correct the distortion
caused by the migration prospects. The provision of a subsidy increases the wages of T -
skilled workers, and raises the horizontal line in the figure further up. When the subsidy
is set optimally, the indifferent agent is once again indexed by j′. Since the subsidy does
not distort the demand for skills, this is sufficient to repristinate optimality. For that




· pG at−1 ω̄Gt + (1− pG)ωGt
pT at−1 ω̄Tt + (1− pT )ωTt − 1, (17)
where the ‘no-µ’ subscript indicates the optimal wages without migration. When tech-
nical education is subsidized according to this rule, that is when τ = τ∗, the marginal
agent j′ faces the same expected relative returns to accumulating skills, irrespective of
the regime of international mobility.
Notice that, since the strength of the distortion increases with the distance to frontier,
the optimal subsidy τ∗ is an increasing function of at−1. Indeed, recall that the relative
wage ωt decreases with the distance to frontier, going from ω̄∗ to ω∗, as can be clearly
seen from Figure 4; thus, ωTno-µ/ωGno-µ increases with at−1. Moreover, the relative
domestic wage ωGt/ωTt decreases with the distance to frontier, as the productivity of
G-skills decreases with the decreasing weight of innovation relative to imitation. Finally,
pG > pT . Thus, also the second ratio at the right-hand side of (17) increases with at−1.
As the process of development and convergence to the frontier proceeds, the rate of the
subsidy necessary to restore the optimal trajectory declines over time to satisfy (17) at
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each instant (and at each level of the distance to frontier at−1). We can summarize this
discussion in the following result:
Proposition 7. When technical skills are subsidized according to (17), the optimal
accumulation of skills is restored. Moreover, the optimal subsidy rate τ∗ declines over
time, as the technological frontier draws nearer.
Proof. In the text.
Thus, subsidizing technical education when the prospects of migration might distort
accumulation incentives on the part of workers corrects the incentives and restores op-
timality. We view this implication of our model as an interesting rationalization of the
policies performed by the successful East-Asian economies that we discussed in Section
2. There the state invested in specific types of tertiary education, with an eye (and
something more) to the interests of the local employers. The implications of the model,
moreover, seem consistent with the evolution of the attitude of the policymakers respon-
sible for educational policy mentioned by some observers. The shift from interventionism
to laisser-fair is in line with our story: when the structure of the economy changes to
match that of the leading economies, direct interventions in education, to regulate the
structure of the supply of skills become redundant, and the market mechanisms regain
center stage.
8 Conclusions
The debate on the economic effects of the brain drain has not yet reached univocal con-
clusions under many respects. This is particularly true for studies focusing on developing
countries. Recent empirical contributions (e.g. Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2004)
have argued that among developing countries there are both winners and losers, and
concluded that more theoretical work is needed to understand this pattern.
Building on these ideas, we develop a simple theoretical model to investigate whether the
prospects of migration have an influence on growth and convergence. Our contribution
extends the framework of Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2004) to incorporate
the endogeneity of human capital accumulation in a model where growth is driven by
technical progress, and technical progress is the result of purposive activities of imitation
and of bona fide innovation. The main insight from the model is that, at different
levels of development, different types of human capital, or rather different proportion
thereof, are needed to achieve optimal growth. Thus, the key determinant of the optimal
composition of skills in any given economy is its distance from the technological frontier.
By blurring the borders between economic systems at different levels of development,
the possibility of migration distorts price signals, induces change in the accumulation of
human capital, and ultimately proves detrimental for developing countries. We find that
the brain drain reduces the growth rate of a developing country along the transition
to its long-run balanced growth path. Moreover, we point at the possibility of the
emergence of development traps, as the opportunities of migration might reduce the
long-run income level of lagging countries.
Our theoretical contribution also provides some normative conclusions that might shed
more light on the astonishing performance of the most successful East Asian economies
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over the past few decades. From our positive analysis we know that some types of
human capital are more important for the developing countries, but the incentives to
acquire them are reduced by the prospects of migration. Hence, on the normative side,
we show that a very important role can be played by government interventions, e.g. in
the form of subsidies the encourage the acquisition of those particular skills which are
most needed domestically. Moreover, since the distortionary impact of the migration
prospects decline with the proximity to the frontier, the government’s support in favor
of certain skills should taper off as the development process proceeds.
We find this story particularly useful, as it can be used to rationalize the behaviour
of the successful East Asian economies over their path to development. Countries like
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore all experienced both high rates
of GDP growth and of brain drain at the same time: a puzzling story, at first sight.
However, they are also quoted as examples of the government’s intervention in the
educational field, where policies were aimed at favouring the acquisition of technical
skills over other skills. According to our story, these policies might have helped the
growth performance of Japan and of the Asian Tigers by correcting the distortionary
impacts induced by the brain drain. We find more support for the predictive power of
our analysis in the fact that more recently the same countries are advocating a pervasive
change in their educational strategies, to favour the autonomous display of market forces.
This corresponds to the policy a regulator in our model would find optimal once the
technological frontier has been reached.
Our analysis, however, raises a number of questions, the most obvious of which refers to
the empirical relevance of the mechanisms we identify. We present some stylized facts
and anecdotal evidence supporting our theory, yet, a more thorough empirical analysis
is called for by our results. Among our plans for future work, finding the necessary data
and testing the implications of the model necessarily plays a prominent role.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Firms maximize profits choosing employment in productivity-enhancing activities, ta-







nt + (at−1 − 1)T σmtG1−σmt
]
+
− ωGt (Gmt + Gnt)− ωTt (Tmt + Tnt) , (A.1)
s.t. Tmt ≥ 0, Tnt ≥ 0, Gmt ≥ 0, Gnt ≥ 0.
Where we have normalized the expression for profits using the distance to frontier At−1,
letting at−1 ≡ Āt−1/At−1. From the first-order conditions of this problem, we know
that, for every level of the relative wages, the relative demand for skills in innovation
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An interior solution for this problem obtains when the left-end sides of both inequalities
above equal ωGt. Thus, both activities occur in equilibrium whenever









ωφ−σt ≡ ã(ωt). (A.2)
That is, for every value of ωt ≡ ωGt/ωTt, there exists a unique value of at−1, such that





< ã(ωt) ⇒ innovation only;
= ã(ωt) ⇒ innovation and imitation;
> ã(ωt) ⇒ imitation only.
(A.3)
However, from the discussion of the equilibria in Section 4, we know that at any equili-
brium, the wage rate must lay in the interval [ω∗, ω̄∗]. This implies bounds for the range
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of the values of at−1 for which interior solutions may occur in the equilibrium. Let the
lower bound of the interval be ãl = ã(ω̄∗) and the upper bound be ãh = ã(ω∗).
Then, from (A.3), we can conclude that when a < ãl only innovation occurs. While
at−1 > ãh, implies that firms only resort to imitation. For the intermediate range,
at−1 ∈ (ãl, ãh), the equilibrium is characterized by firms performing both imitation and
innovation.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall equation (7),




nt + (Āt−1 −At−1)T σmtG1−σmt ;
the growth rate is:




nt + (at−1 − 1)T σmtG1−σmt . (A.4)
The market solution implies that wages equal the marginal products of the two types
of skills in both activities, using Gnt + Gmt = Gt and Tnt + Tmt = Tt, we write this as:





nt = (at−1 − 1)σ(Tt − Tnt)σ−1(Gt −Gnt)1−σ.






















Let G∗t be the growth maximizing value of Gt:




nt + (at−1 − 1)(Tt − Tnt)σ(Gt −Gnt)1−σ;
since gt is strictly concave and continuous, and Tt is a function of Gt according to (4),




























Since this expression is identical to (A.5), we conclude that the market outcome is
growth maximizing.
21This is without loss of generality, focusing on innovation yields equivalent results.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 1 we know that the lagging country can be in any of three situations: it
can be performing innovation only (when a ≤ ãl), it can be engaging in both innovation
and imitation (when a ∈ (ãl, ãh)), or it can be fully specialized in imitation (when
a ≤ ãh). Under the innovation-only regime, the lagging country is, by symmetry,
identical to the technological leader, and its growth rate will then be ḡ, a constant.
If imitation and innovation co-exist at the optimum, the growth rate will be given by
(A.4). Proposition 2 shows that for each level of at−1, this function is maximized by the
solution of our model. Moreover, the function in (A.4) is continuously differentiable in






In the imitation-only case, equation (A.4) reduces to
gt = (at−1 − 1)T σt G1−σt , (A.7)
and the same reasoning goes through. We can conclude that the growth rate of the
lagging economy increases with the distance to frontier and is higher than the rate of
frontier expansion at each point where a > ãl.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
First notice that when pG = pT = p the labour supply of the lagging country, implicitly
defined by (15), coincides with the one for the leading economy whenever ω = ω̄. In this
case, by symmetry, the two economies are identical and their growth rates are also equal.
Hence when the lagging country, has a distance to frontier equal to ãl, it specializes in
innovation, and will grow at the same rate as the leading economy: gt = ḡ.
Whenever at ∈ (ãl, ãh), both innovation and imitation occur at the same time. The
growth rate of the economy is then:
gt(·) = T φntG1−φnt + (at−1 − 1)T σmtG1−σmt .
In the presence of migration, the equilibrium level of G and T , and the split thereof, will
not be the same as without migration, hence the growth rate will not be maximized.
Differentiating the above expression with respect to at−1 yields:
dgt
dat−1





+ (1− φ)T φntG−φnt
∂Gnt
∂at−1










At any interior equilibrium it must be the case that φTφ−1nt G
1−φ
nt = (at−1−1)σT σ−1mt G1−σmt =
ωTGt, and (1 − φ)T φntG−φnt = (at−1 − 1)(1 − σ)T σmtG−σmt = ωGt. Moreover, since T =
Tmt + Tnt, it follows that ∂Tnt/∂at−1 = ∂Tt/∂at−1 − ∂Tmt/∂at−1; a similar expression
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mt > 0, (A.9)
since both terms are always positive. Indeed, as discussed in section 6.1, the term in
square brackets is always negative since the supply curve under migration, and hence
the equilibrium value of the ware rate ω, lies below the supply curve relative to the no





1− 2Gt. Since ∂Gt/∂at−1 < 0 because the equilibrium level of Gt decreases with
ωt, while ωt decreases with the distance to frontier, the first term is always positive.
The positivity of the second term at the right-hand side, on the other hand, is trivial.
To conclude the proof notice that when only imitation occurs by a similar reasoning we
immediately get (A.9), by setting Tmt = Tt and Gmt = G.
Thus, we have shown that the lagging economy grows faster than the leading one for
each level of the distance to frontier larger than ãl, while it grows just at the same
rate as the frontier when full specialization in innovation (i.e. convergence) is finally
achieved.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Notice that the proof in Proposition 5 that the growth rate of the lagging economy
increases with the distance to frontier holds irrespective of the values of pG and pT .
Hence, also in this case we can conclude that g increases monotonically with a. Thus,
there is a tendency for the technologically lagging country to converge.
To prove that the process stops prematurely when the probability of migration is dif-
ferent for workers with different types of skills, recall (16). If the distance to frontier
were ãl and firms in the lagging country were to specialize in innovation, by symmetry,
domestic wages would equal foreign ones. Contrary to before though, the two economies
are not identical, given the wedge induced by the different probabilities of migration.
Thus the accumulation of human capital is distorted. From Proposition 2, the growth
rate is maximized in the leading country. Since g is strictly concave and continuous, it
follows that the growth rate that can be obtained for ãl by the lagging country can only
be smaller than ḡ.
Since the growth rate increases monotonically with a, it follows immediately that the
lagging country will stop converging towards the frontier at a level of the distance to
frontier atrap > ãl.
Thus, the steady-state distance to frontier is increased by the possibility of migration
and that no specialization in innovation is possible in this case.
